CCIP Service Limits (EVM)
CCIP enforces service limits to maintain reliable and predictable cross-chain execution. Limits are enforced during message processing and execution. Values vary by chain and deployment.
EVM Chains
| Item | Description | Limit |
|---|---|---|
Maximum message data length | data payload sent within the CCIP message. | 32 kilobytes |
| Maximum number of tokens | Maximum number of token transfers (entries in the message's tokenAmounts array) a user can include in a single message. | 1 |
| Token Pool Execution Gas Limit | Maximum gas for executing the combined steps in token pools during cross-chain transfers, including (1) balanceOf check before minting/releasing, (2) releaseOrMint function, and (3) balanceOf check after minting/releasing. For more details on building custom token pools and handling gas constraints, refer to the Token Pools documentation. | 90,000 |
| Message Execution Gas Limit | User-specified gas limit. | Varies by destination chain (see table below) |
Message Execution Gas Limit by destination chain
These limits are for CCIP 2.0 lanes. For CCIP V1 lanes, see the V1 service limits.
| Destination chain | Gas limit |
|---|---|
| 0G | 15M |
| Arbitrum | 15M |
| Avalanche | 15M |
| Base | 15M |
| BNB Chain | 15M |
| Ethereum | 15M |
| HyperEVM | 15M |
| Ink | 15M |
| Mantle | 15M |
| Plasma | 15M |
| Plume | 15M |
| Polygon | 15M |
| Unichain | 6M |
Network-Specific Limitations
Some EVM networks have additional constraints beyond the standard limits above:
| Network | Special Considerations | Documentation |
|---|---|---|
| HyperEVM | Data availability limitations during RPC downtime | HyperEVM Service Limits |
Private / Permissioned Network Limitations
Some CCIP integrations are with private / permissioned networks. CCIP's integration with these networks depends on a single centralized RPC provider rather than a distinct set of local nodes or RPCs used by node operators. As a result:
- Transaction data sourced from these networks cannot be independently verified across multiple nodes in the same way as public chains.
- A compromised RPC provider could manipulate transaction data, up to and including theft of bridged funds.
- Anomalous or malicious activity on these networks may be harder to detect and alert on, as monitoring infrastructure relies on the same private RPC layer.
Developers and integrators building CCIP integrations on private / permissioned networks should review these constraints carefully and implement additional safeguards for their use case. Safeguards include, but are not limited to, more conservative token pool rate limits, monitoring of messages and token transfers, and emergency preparedness.